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ABSTRACT 
Two recent reviews report that the empirical findings in information technology outsourcing 
(ITO) research are frequently inconsistent with the prevailing dominant analytical framework of 
transaction cost economics (TCE). While employing similar methodologies, the two reviews propose 
different strategies to resolve the inconsistencies. One is to improve the methodological rigor, 
specifically, the operationalization of TCE constructs. The other is to abandon TCE in favor of a new 
analytical framework. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the empirical findings on the choice of 
contract type as a function of task uncertainty. The results support both strategies. Refining the 
operationalization of TCE constructs, specifically of task uncertainty, would have improved the 
reliability of findings on TCE-based relationships between task uncertainty and the choice of contract 
type. However, independent of such methodological improvements, TCE is of limited relevance in 
recent ITO research for predicting the choice of contract type. Generalizing these findings, we 
conclude that ITO research requires a new analytical framework to further develop the theory of ITO 
and to provide sound guidance to the ITO industry. 
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HIGHLIGHTS 
• We use meta-analysis to review empirical findings on the relationship between task 
uncertainty and choice of contract type in the ITO literature. 
• The dataset for the meta-analysis contains 22 independent empirical samples that 
include data on 6,479 ITO engagements. 
• We find that the relationship between task uncertainty and choice of contract type is 
contingent on the operationalization of task uncertainty and on the period to which the 
data refers. 
• We argue that a core assumption of transaction cost economics on how uncertainty 
affects contractual governance is no longer applicable to ITO research.  
• We conclude that ITO research needs a new analytical framework to further develop 
the theory of ITO. 
 
Keywords: IT outsourcing; Transaction Cost Economics; Task uncertainty; Choice of contract 





Information technology outsourcing (ITO) theory has contributed significantly to the 
development of best practice in the ITO industry. For example, ITO research examines the decision to 
outsource (e.g., Watjatrakul, 2005) and how to establish effective formal and relational governance 
for ITO engagements (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In this literature, transaction cost economics 
(TCE) is the dominant analytical framework from which many of the predictions in ITO research are 
derived (See Aubert et al., 2012; Dibbern et al., 2004; Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011; Klein, 2002; 
Lacity et al., 2011).  
Two recent reviews report significant inconsistencies among the empirical findings for TCE-
based predictions in the ITO literature (See Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011; Lacity et al., 2011). The 
reviews employ similar methodologies and report similar levels of inconsistency. However, they 
present different explanations for the inconsistencies. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) argue that 
measurement errors and construct validity threats explain the inconsistencies. They call for more 
rigorous methodology, including the operationalization of TCE constructs. In contrast, Lacity et al. 
(2011) argue that TCE is an increasingly obsolete analytical framework for ITO research. They call 
for the development of an “endogenous” ITO theory.  
We adopt meta-analysis to investigate the two explanations in the specific context of the 
relationship between task uncertainty (TU) and the choice of contract type (CT) in the ITO literature. 
We choose this relationship because TCE makes specific and unambiguous predictions about the 
choice of CT as a function of TU. To examine the two explanations, the meta-analysis investigates 
whether the cumulative findings for the relationship between TU and choice of CT in the ITO 
literature support the conclusions by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and/or by Lacity et al. (2011) 
for the inconsistencies between empirical findings and TCE-based predictions. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we derive two hypotheses that model the assumptions 
that underpin the different conclusions drawn by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and by Lacity et 
al. (2011). Next, we explain how meta-analysis enables us to test each of the hypotheses, which would 
not be possible using the vote-counting methodology adopted by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) 
and Lacity et al. (2011). The results support both hypotheses. We discuss the results, potential 
limitations, and implications for theory and practice. In conclusion, we agree with Lacity et al. (2011) 






In IT outsourcing research, researchers frequently adopt the analytical framework of 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to model two critical decisions in ITO engagements. One is the 
decision to outsource IT, which is predominantly modeled as a function of asset specificity (Crook et 
al., 2013). This is commonly referred to as the ‘make-or-buy’ decision (Riordan and Williamson, 
1985). The other decision and the focus of this paper is on the choice of “governance features” 
(Williamson, 1991, p. 269). This choice is modeled as a function of uncertainty. Governance features 
are “special adaptive mechanisms to effect realignment and restore efficiency when beset by 
unanticipated disturbances” (Williamson, 1991, p. 272).  
Here, we examine the empirical findings on the choice of contract type (CT), which is an 
important example of the application of TCE-based governance features in the ITO literature. 
Realigning transactions in response to disturbances incurs costs (Williamson, 2008). The choice 
between different contract types, specifically time-and-material (TM) contracts and fixed-price (FP) 
contracts, allocates those additional costs to the parties to the contract (Hoermann et al., 2015). In the 
ITO context, monitoring costs and renegotiation costs are allocated to the vendor or the client (Osei-
Bryson and Ngwenyama, 2006; Susarla et al., 2009).  
Under TM contracts, vendors are remunerated on the basis of reported working hours or 
working days. The client carries the risk of budget overruns. The client incurs monitoring costs to 
limit the risk of vendors charging for more resources than the project goals require. In FP contracts, 
budget overruns affect the project profitability for the vendor (Ethiraj et al., 2005; Gopal and Koka, 
2012; Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Gopal et al., 2003).  
Therefore, FP contracts provide strong incentives for vendors to manage projects efficiently 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). For example, vendors 
assign more trained personnel to FP projects compared with TM projects (Arora and Asundi, 1999; 
Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). In general, FP contracts incur lower monitoring costs compared 
with TM contracts because of the different incentive structures. 
In contrast, renegotiation costs are higher under FP contracts compared with TM contracts 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). FP contracts typically 
include detailed project plans, specify the functional requirements, service levels, and costs (Fink et 
al., 2013). When unforeseen contingencies occur, project specifications must be renegotiated, which 
generates additional costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). This is not the case under TM contracts, which, 
compared with FP contracts, include more coarse-grained plans that allow for adjustments to 
specifications during the course of the project (Fink et al., 2013). So, under TM contracts, vendors are 
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more willing to accept adjustments without the need for costly renegotiations (Kalnins and Mayer, 
2004; Susarla et al., 2009). 
TCE models this choice between FP contracts and TM contracts as a problem of minimizing 
transaction costs, which are a function of task uncertainty (TU). Indeed, ITO engagements “could well 
become nonviable when the frequency of disturbances reaches a high level” (Williamson, 1991, p. 
291). In high TU contexts, the lower renegotiation costs under TM contracts compared with FM 
contracts outweigh the lower monitoring costs under FP contracts compared with TM contracts. In 
low TU contexts, the lower monitoring costs under FP contracts compared with TM contracts 
outweigh the lower renegotiation costs under TM contracts compared with FM contracts (See, for 
example, Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Dey et al., 2010; Kalnins and Mayer, 
2004; Susarla et al., 2009). Formally, TCE predicts that the frequency with which TM contracts are 
chosen instead of FP contracts is a positive function of TU. 
Restricting our meta-analysis to the relationship between TU and choice of CT allows us to 
investigate whether the inconsistent empirical findings in the ITO literature are a function of the 
methodologies employed and/or the relevance of the TCE analytical framework. To test the former 
explanation, we examine whether the correlation between TU and CT is contingent on how TU is 
operationalized (See Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011). 
To do this, we compare the effect of the five measures of, or proxies for, TU on the magnitude 
of the relationship between TU and CT. The five constructs are technological uncertainty (e.g., 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Maruping and Ahuja, 2012), requirements 
uncertainty (e.g., Gopal and Koka, 2012; Huckman and Staats, 2011; Rai et al., 2009; Susarla, 2012; 
Susarla et al., 2009; Tiwana, 2010), technological complexity (e.g., Bapna et al., 2012; Chen and 
Bharadwaj, 2009a; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Gefen et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2008; Rai et al., 2009; 
Susarla, 2012), organizational complexity (e.g., Chen and Heng, 2012; Maruping and Ahuja, 2012; 
Pee et al., 2010; Staats et al., 2012; Weber et al., 2011) and project size (e.g., Argyres et al., 2007; 
Ethiraj et al., 2005; Mani et al., 2012; Ramachandran and Gopal, 2010; Staats et al., 2011; Staats et 
al., 2012). Formally, we use meta-analysis to test: 
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of the relationship between TU and CT reported in the ITO 
literature is a function of the operationalization of TU. 
In contrast, the explanation according to Lacity et al. (2011) is that the frequent inconsistencies 
among the empirical findings for TCE-based predictions are the result of changes in ITO management 
practices in response to the increasingly competitive and consolidated ITO market (Manning, 2013). 
For example, vendors have become subject to powerful market pressure to control costs, reducing the 
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importance of monitoring costs. Management practices, including standardization, centralization and 
modularization, have enabled ITO vendors to develop contractual governance mechanisms, which 
include effective risk buffers, to manage both FP and TM contracts efficiently and effectively.  
At the same time, ITO clients are becoming better informed due to increasing market 
transparency (Reimann et al., 2010), which decreases renegotiation costs. Together, these effects on 
vendors and clients have reduced the relative transaction cost differentials between FM and TM 
contracts, and, therefore, reduced the relationship between TU and choice of CT. So, the benefits 
predicted by TCE from the appropriate choice of CT as a function of TU have declined over time. 
Formally, we use meta-analysis to test: 
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the relationship between TU and CT reported in the ITO 
literature is a function of the period of investigation. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Meta-analysis is a suite of quantitative techniques to synthesize empirical research findings 
across multiple studies (Glass, 1976; Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). The input 
data are effect sizes, frequently correlation coefficients, from individual studies addressing the 
relationship of interest (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Meta-analysis utilizes the total sample size by 
aggregating across the individual studies to estimate more reliable effect sizes compared with 
traditional review procedures, including narrative reviews or vote-counting approaches (Glass et al., 
1981; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001). In this way, our meta-analysis 
complements the studies of Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and of Lacity et al. (2011), which are 
based on the vote-counting methodology. 
Meta-analysis is a widely accepted methodology in the reference disciplines of information 
systems (IS) research. It is also increasingly being used in IS research (See, for example, He and 
King, 2008; Joseph et al., 2007; Sabherwal et al., 2006; Sharma and Yetton, 2003, 2007; Sharma et 
al., 2009; Wu and Lederer, 2009). In the following sections, we describe the literature search, coding, 
and analysis. 
Literature Search 
The relationship between TU and choice of CT is the subject of a major research stream in the 
ITO literature (See Fink et al., 2013; Gefen et al., 2008; Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Gopal et 
al., 2003; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Susarla et al., 2009). This body of research is sufficiently large to 
support a meta-analysis to examine Hypotheses 1 and 2. The sample of individual studies in the meta-
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analysis consists of empirical studies reported in journals, forthcoming journal papers, conference 
proceedings, dissertations, and working papers. Conference proceedings, dissertations, and working 
papers are included to address the “file-drawer problem”. This refers to the issue that published 
studies, compared with unpublished studies, may systematically overestimate effect sizes (Rosenthal, 
1979). 
Following the recommendations by Cooper (2010) and meta-analyses in IS (See Sharma and 
Yetton, 2003, 2007; Wu and Lederer, 2009), we conducted four complementary literature searches to 
minimize the probability of failing to identify relevant studies. First, we conducted a systematic 
keyword search in the following databases1: Business Source Premier, JSTOR, ScienceDirect, 
ABI/INFORM, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, The Association for Information Systems 
Electronic Library (AISeL), ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, and WorldCat Dissertations and 
Theses2. Second, we conducted backward and forward searches (Webster and Watson, 2002). Third, 
we searched for working papers and forthcoming journal papers by screening the websites of key 
authors identified in the previous steps, conducting keyword searches in Google, and searching the 
Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Fourth, we sent requests for unpublished working papers 
using the AISworld and AOM OCIS mailing lists. 
We included a study in the final meta-analytical dataset if the study satisfied three criteria. 
First, the study investigates ITO engagements as its unit of analysis. Second, the study measures the 
choice of CT and one or more operationalizations of TU. Multiple studies based on the same sample 
were included only when each of the studies reports at least one operationalization of TU that is not 
reported in the others. Third, the study reports the sample size, the years for which the data was 
collected, and the correlation coefficients between TU and choice of CT. For the studies in which any 
of these statistics were missing, we contacted the corresponding author of the study and requested the 
missing statistics. This process identified three additional studies.  
																																								 																				
1  Following Sabherwal et al. (2006) we used several keywords related to IS outsourcing projects (including 
“software”, “information system”, “information technology”, “outsourcing”) and several keywords related to 
contract type (including, “contract”, “fixed price”, “time and materials”, “cost plus”) and their variants (e.g., 
“fixed-price”). 
2  The databases included the major journals and conference proceedings in the IS and management disciplines 
such as Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ), Information Systems Research (ISR), Journal 
of Management Information Systems (JMIS), Management Science (MS), Academy of Management Journal 
(AMJ), Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), 
Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), European Conference on Information Systems 
(ECIS), and Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). 
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The final meta-analytical dataset includes 28 studies based on 22 independent samples3. The 
dataset includes data on 6,479 ITO engagements. Of the 28 studies, 59% do not support the logic of 
TCE for the effect of TU on choice of CT. This is similar in magnitude to the findings in the two 
reviews: Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) report that 44% of TCE-based hypotheses are not 
supported and Lacity et al. (2011) report that 51% of TCE-based hypotheses are not supported. 
Coding 
We extracted the following information from each study in the final meta-analytical dataset: 
sample size, start year and end year of the sample4, and the name and description of all variables that 
were used by the authors to measure properties of TU. For each measure of TU, we extracted the 
correlation coefficient between CT and TU, and the reliability coefficient to estimate the measurement 
error. In total, we extracted 92 correlation coefficients for the relationship between TU and choice of 
CT as input for coding the dependent variable (choice of CT) and the independent variable (TU) for 
each study.  
The dependent variable 
The individual studies included in the final meta-analytical dataset operationalize the choice of 
CT as a binary variable. Where necessary, we converted the reported correlation coefficients, so that 
higher values correspond to stronger preferences for a TM contract compared with an FP contract and 
lower values correspond to a stronger preference for an FP contract compared with a TM contract. 
The independent variable 
TCE-based research operationalizes TU with variables that relate to particular properties of TU, 
including technological uncertainty and requirements uncertainty, or proxies that are highly 
interrelated with TU, including technological complexity, organizational complexity and project size 
(See Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Fink et al., 2013; Kalnins and Mayer, 
2004)5.  
We coded each variable of the 92 correlation coefficients according to how the authors of each 
study operationalized TU. For instance, we coded the level of familiarity with particular programming 
																																								 																				
3  Appendix 1 provides an overview of the final meta-analytical sample. Furthermore, a ‘*’ in the references 
denotes a study as part of the final meta-analytical sample. 
4  The start year and end year define the period of investigation. In studies using secondary data, this is the 
period of time for which the data was extracted from public or private archives. In other studies, this is the 
period of time during which the authors collected the data.  
5  Definitions and coding examples for the different operationalizations of TU are presented in Appendix 2. A 
complete mapping of the study variables to the different operationalizations of technological uncertainty is 
presented in Appendix 3. 
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languages as technological uncertainty (See Banerjee and Duflo (2000). This process identified 10 
effect sizes for technological uncertainty, 10 effect sizes for requirements uncertainty, 19 effect sizes 
for technological complexity, 22 effect sizes for organizational complexity, and 31 effect sizes for 
project size.  
This process involved judgment by the coders (Heugens and Lander, 2009). To minimize 
coding errors, we adopted the protocol recommended by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). Two coders 
independently coded each study. The initial Cohen (1960) kappa was 0.94, which demonstrates a high 
inter-coder reliability. Disagreements between the coders were resolved very quickly through 
discussion. 
Analysis 
The unit of analysis is the zero-order, Pearson correlation coefficient between CT and TU. This 
is a well understood, scale-free measure of the relationship between two variables (Rosenthal and 
DiMatteo, 2001). The Fisher z transformation, a potential alternative unit of analysis, was not adopted 
because it introduces an expected positive bias that is larger than the expected negative bias when 
using untransformed correlation coefficients (See Hall and Brannik, 2002; Hunter and Schmidt, 
2004).  
We corrected the correlation coefficients for measurement error by dividing each correlation 
coefficient by the product of the square root of the reliability coefficient for the TU and CT variables 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). If a measurement was based on a single-item or a proxy variable, we 
adopted a conservative standard of 0.8 for the reliability coefficient (Bommer et al., 1995; Dalton et 
al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Jiang et al., 2012; Sleesman et al., 2010). 
We prepared the final meta-analytical dataset in three steps. The first step estimates 
independent effect sizes for each of the 22 independent samples included in the meta-analytical 
dataset. This avoids biased estimates that would result from the inclusion of interdependent effect 
sizes in the meta-analysis (See He and King, 2008; Palmatier et al., 2006). When a sample was used 
to measure more than one variable related to TU, for example, both project size and requirements 
uncertainty, we averaged the effect sizes of all variables (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Palmatier et al., 
2006). The initial 92 correlation coefficients were combined to estimate 22 independent effect sizes at 
the sample-level. 
The second step estimates independent effect sizes for each of the operationalizations of TU. 
When a study reports more than one variable related to a particular operationalization of TU, for 
example, the length of the ITO engagement and the contract value, which both refer to project size as 
an operationalization of TU, we averaged the corresponding effect sizes (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; 
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Palmatier et al., 2006). The initial 92 correlation coefficients were combined to estimate 64 
independent effect sizes for the different operationalization of TU. This avoids biased estimates that 
would result from including interdependent effect sizes for the different operationalizations of TU 
(See He and King, 2008; Palmatier et al., 2006). 
The third step ensures an unbiased analysis of potential temporal effects as the final meta-
analytical dataset includes samples that cover more than 20 years (e.g. Chen and Heng, 2012). We 
partition the final meta-analytical dataset into two subsets using a median-split based on the start year 
of the period of investigation (𝑆𝑌𝑆#$%&'( = 1999). The subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ includes 11 
independent samples that have a start year prior to or including 1999.  
The other subset ‘SYS > 1999’ includes 11 independent samples with a start year of 2000 or 
later. While the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ contain data beyond 19996, the subset ‘SYS > 1999’ does not 
include data prior to 2000. Using the same logic for partitioning at the level of operationalizations of 
TU results in 32 independent effect sizes for different operationalizations of TU prior to and including 
1999 and 32 independent effect sizes for different operationalizations of TU post 1999. 
Following recent meta-analyses in IS (See Joseph et al., 2007; Sabherwal et al., 2006), we 
adopted the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) random effects model. Weighting the correlation coefficients 
by sample size and reliability, the following meta-analytic outcomes were estimated: the number of 
effect sizes (𝑘), the total sample size (𝑁), the average corrected correlation (expected rho; 𝜌), the 
standard deviation of rho (𝑆𝐷2), and the 95-percent confidence interval around the expected rho 
(𝐶𝐼2;.78)
7.  
Positive values of 𝜌 indicate that the frequency with which TM contracts are chosen instead of 
FP contracts is a positive function of TU. Negative values of 𝜌	indicate that the frequency with which 
TM contracts are chosen instead of FP contracts is a negative function of TU. The relationship of TU 
and choice of CT is statistically significant when 𝐶𝐼2;.78 does not include zero. 
In addition, we calculated three meta-analytic outcomes to assess the generalizability of the 
results: the 80-percent credibility interval around the expected rho (𝐶𝑅2;.;<); the percentage of 
variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts (%𝑉); and the Cochran (1954) chi-square statistic 
for heterogeneity (𝑄). In contrast to 𝐶𝐼2;.78, which refers to the accuracy of 𝜌, the 𝐶𝑅2;.;< refers to the 
distribution of 𝜌	and is used to assess the generalizability of the 𝜌	(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). When 
																																								 																				
6    This source of bias is discussed below under the heading of test procedure. 
7  We used Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) formula for individually corrected correlation coefficients to calculate 
the standard error of the estimated average correlations: 𝑆𝐸2 = 𝑆𝐷A/√𝑘. 
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𝐶𝑅2;.;< is large or includes zero, 𝜌	does not generalize (Whitener, 1990). Instead, the distribution of 𝜌 
is assumed to be heterogeneous. Similarly, if %𝑉 is less than 75 percent, Hunter and Schmidt (2004) 
suggest that the relationship is heterogeneous. When 𝑄 is significant, 𝜌	does not generalize. Instead, it 
should be interpreted as the expected value of a number of effects rather than a common true effect 
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985). 
Test procedure 
We test Hypotheses 1 and 2 as follows. First, we examine the hypotheses using the 22 
independent effect sizes partitioned into two subsets (SYS ≤ 1999 and SYS > 1999). We use the 
ANOVA-based analysis procedure proposed by Borenstein et al. (2009). This is based on a 
decomposition of 𝑄, Cochran’s (1954) chi-square statistic for heterogeneity (See Park and Shaw, 
2013). A significant 𝑄D&EF&(-statistic is interpreted as showing that the remaining heterogeneity within 
the subsets includes a number of effects rather than a common true effect. This would support 
Hypothesis 1. In that case, a significant 𝑄D&EF&(-statistic would justify a meta-analytic examination of 
the different operationalizations of TU. 
A significant 𝑄G$ED$$(-statistic is interpreted as showing that a significant proportion of the 
heterogeneity in the total dataset is explained by the moderator variable. So, a significant 𝑄G$ED$$(-
statistic would support Hypothesis 2. In that case, the effect size is a function of the period of 
investigation.  
The estimated effect sizes of TU and CT for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ would be biased when 
Hypothesis 2 is true because this subset includes data on ITO engagements during 2000 and later (See 
Appendix 1). For example, the sample used by Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a) starts in 1993 and ends 
in 2003. So when Hypothesis 2 is true, the estimated effect sizes for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ would 
include a negative bias. The estimated effect size for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ would be less than the 
true unbiased value. For the subset ‘SYS > 1999’, the estimated effect size would be unbiased as this 
subset does not contain data on ITO engagements before 2000.  
The test for Hypothesis 2 examines whether the expected effect size for the subset ‘SYS ≤ 
1999’ is significantly greater than the expected effect size for the subset ‘SYS > 1999’. So, the 
negative bias in the estimates of the effect size for subset ‘SYS ≤ 1999’ increases the probability of a 
false negative result and not for a false positive one. Therefore, a significant finding for the 𝑄G$ED$$(-
statistic is not subject to a potential internal validity threat. In addition, we conducted sensitivity 
analyses for different start years of the period of investigation because the choice of a median split to 
partition the final meta-analytical sample is somewhat arbitrary (See Appendix 4). The results 
reported below are robust for different partitions.  
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A significant 𝑄D&EF&(-statistic would justify a meta-analytic examination of the different 
operationalizations of TU to test Hypothesis 1. Again, we use the ANOVA-based analysis procedure 
based on the decomposition of 𝑄 (Borenstein et al., 2009). Here, a significant 𝑄G$ED$$(HI-statistic is 
interpreted as support for Hypothesis 1, showing that a significant proportion of the heterogeneity in 
each subset can be explained by the different operationalizations of TU. The median split partition by 
SYS does not bias this test because the analysis is within each subset, not between them, which is the 
case for the test of Hypothesis 2. 
RESULTS 
The results in Table 1 support Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of the relationship between TU and 
CT reported in the ITO literature is a function of the operationalization of TU. The 𝑄D&EF&(-statistics 
are significant (𝑄D&EF&(JKJLM777= 22.92, p < 0.05; 𝑄D&EF&(JKJNM777= 24.18, p < 0.05).  
 𝒌 𝑵 𝝆 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎 %𝑽 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 
SYS	≤ 1999 11 3,096 .15 .08 .08 : .21   .05 : .25 .47 22.92* 9.09* 
SYS	> 1999 11 3,152 .05 .08 -.01 : .11 -.05 : .15 .45 24.18* 
𝒌: Number of effect sizes; 𝑵: Total sample size; 𝝆: Expected rho; 𝑆𝐷2: Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓: 95% confidence interval around 𝜌; 
𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎: 80% credibility interval around 𝜌;	%𝐕: Percentage of variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts;	𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏: Cochran’s chi-
square statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subset; 𝐐𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧: Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained 
by the SYS; * 𝒑-value of 𝑄 < 0.05. A sensitivity analysis for different values of SYS is reported in Appendix 4.	
Table 1.	 The relationship between TU and choice of CT controlling for SYS	
The results in Table 1 also support Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the relationship between 
TU and CT reported in the ITO literature is a function of the period of investigation. The 𝑄G$ED$$(-
statistic is significant (𝑄G$ED$$( = 9.09, p < 0.05). In the subset SYS	≤ 1999, the effect of TU on CT 
(𝜌 =	.15) is significantly larger than in the subset SYS	> 1999 (𝜌 =	.05). In addition, in the subset 
SYS	≤ 1999, consistent with TCE, the effect of TU on CT is significant (𝐶𝐼2;.78 does not include 
zero). In contrast, in the subset SYS	> 1999, inconsistent with TCE, the effect of TU on CT is not 
significant (𝐶𝐼2;.78 includes zero).
8  
The significant 𝑄D&EF&(-statistics in Table 1 motivated a meta-analytic examination of the 
different operationalizations of TU. Table 2 shows that, consistent with the significant values for 
𝑄D&EF&(	 reported in Table 1, the different operationalizations of TU have different effect sizes. The 
𝑄G$ED$$(HI statistic is significant for both the subset SYS≤1999 (𝑄G$ED$$(HI = 34.53, p < 0.05) and 
the subset SYS>1999 (𝑄G$ED$$(HI = 23.74, p < 0.05). This supports Hypothesis 1: The 
operationalizations of TU explain a significant proportion of the variance in the expected correlation 
coefficients in each subset.  
																																								 																				
8 The sensitivity analysis presented in Appendix 4 shows that the test for Hypothesis 2 is robust and not 




Operationalization of TU 𝒌 𝑵 𝝆 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏𝑻𝑼 
SYS	≤	1999 
    Technological uncertainty 2 559 .17 .15 -.06 : .40 
34.53* 
    Requirements uncertainty 3 640 .29 .13 .12 : .46 
    Technological complexity 10 2,986 .05 .06 -.01 : .11 
    Organizational complexity 6 1,826 .12 .08 .03 : .21 
    Project size 11 3,090 .21 .10 .14 : .28 
SYS	>	1999  
    Technological uncertainty 3 753 .05 .04 -.05 : .15 
23.74* 
    Requirements uncertainty 7 1,661 .07 .12 -.03 : .18 
    Technological complexity 5 1,434 .02 .11 -.09 : .13 
    Organizational complexity 8 2,803 -.06 .17 -.18 : .07 
    Project size 9 2,615 .10 .21 -.04 : .24 
𝑘: Number of effect sizes; 𝑁: Total sample size; 𝜌: Expected rho; 𝑆𝐷2: Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝐶𝐼2;.78: 95% confidence interval around 𝜌, 
𝑄G$ED$$(HI  : Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained by the operationalization of TU; *: 𝑝-value of 𝑄 < 0.05.	
Table 2.	 The relationship between TU and choice of CT controlling for SYS and the 
operationalization of TU	
The results in Table 2 are also consistent with Hypothesis 2. Three operationalizations of TU 
(requirements uncertainty, organizational complexity, and project size) in subset SYS≤1999 have 
significant effects on the choice of CT. In contrast, no operationalization of TU in the subset 
SYS>1999 has a significant effect on the choice of CT (𝐶𝐼2;.78 includes zero for all 
operationalizations of TU).  
Secondary analysis 
Table 3 reports the statistics for the studies for which the datasets included data only for years 
post 1999. Inspecting Table 3, the estimates of the correlation coefficient between CT and TU (ρ) 
appear to trend towards zero, from 0.05, for data collected after 1999, to 0.01, for data collected after 
2005. The latter include data on 791 ITO engagements. The estimated correlation coefficients for the 
most recent samples, post 2004 and post 2005, are trivially different from zero.  
Consistent with the interpretation that ρ is declining for samples collected post 1999, the 
Qrstusv	statistic, which tests whether the estimates of ρ are stable, also decreases over this range of 
years (SYS). The numbers of studies in the subsets are not large enough to test the above 
interpretations. However, the patterns in Table 3 are consistent with Hypothesis 2 and with the effect 
of TU on CT tending to zero over time. 
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 SYS after 𝒌 𝑵 𝝆 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎 %𝑽 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 
1999 11 3,152 .05 .08 -.01 : .11 -.05 : .15 .45 24.18* 
2000 10 2,914 .04 .07 -.03 : .10 -.05 : .13 .51 19.44* 
2001 8 2,606 .04 .08 -.03 : .11 -.06 : .14 .42 18.73* 
2003 6 1,867 .08 .06 .00 : .15 .00 : .16 .56 10.57 
2004 5 872 .03 .08 -.08 : .14 -.07 : .14 .57 8.75 
2005 4 791 .01 .03 -.08 : .10 -.03 : .04 .92 4.31 
𝒌: Number of effect sizes; 𝑵: Total sample size; 𝝆: Expected rho; 𝑆𝐷2: Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓: 95% confidence interval around 𝜌; 
𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎: 80% credibility interval around 𝜌;	%𝐕: Percentage of variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts;	𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏: Cochran’s chi-
square statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subset; 𝐐𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 : Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained 
by the SYS 
Table 3.	 The relationship between TU and choice of CT for various SYS > 1999 
	
DISCUSSION 
Here, we begin by summarizing the findings for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Then, we consider five 
limitations with respect to these findings. Finally, we generalize the findings to TCE-based 
predictions in the ITO literature, and explore the implications for the theory and practice of ITO. 
Findings 
The results support both the explanation by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and the 
explanation by Lacity et al. (2011) for the frequent inconsistencies between the empirical findings for 
predictions based on TCE that are reported in the ITO literature. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) 
explain the inconsistent empirical findings as a function of measurement errors and construct validity 
threats. Consistent with this explanation, the significant 𝑄D&EF&(-statistics in Table 1, and the diverse 
range of effect sizes combined with the significant 𝑄G$ED$$(HI-statistics for each of the two subsets in 
Table 2, show that the magnitude of the relationship between TU and choice of CT is contingent on 
the operationalization of TU, independent of the period of investigation. Generalizing these findings, 
and consistent with the explanation by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) , there is a major potential 
construct validity threat to the findings in the ITO literature as a function of how variables are 
operationalized. 
Lacity et al. (2011) explain the inconsistent empirical findings in terms of TCE becoming an 
increasingly obsolete analytical framework for ITO research. Consistent with this explanation, the 
relationship between TU and choice of CT is a function of the period of investigation. In the early 
research, the relationship between TU and CT is significantly positive as predicted by TCE. However, 
in more recent research, the findings in Tables 1 and 3 show that the relationship between TU and CT 
is non-significant and trending to zero.  
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In combination, our results show that the two strategies proposed by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. 
(2011) and by Lacity et al. (2011) are complementary rather than competing strategies. Karimi-
Alaghehband et al. (2011) call for a more refined and more rigorous operationalizations of TCE 
constructs. Consistent with this, we show and agree that the operationalization of TU constructs was 
and still potentially is an important issue in ITO research.  
Lacity et al. (2011) call for the development of an “endogenous” ITO theory to replace the 
analytical framework of TCE. We show that the TCE-based prediction of the choice of CT as a 
function of TU is not supported in datasets containing data collected post 1999, independent of the 
operationalization of TU. Generalizing this result to the ITO literature, our results support the call by 
Lacity et al. (2011) that ITO research requires a new analytical framework to further develop the 
theory of ITO and to provide sound guidance to the ITO industry.  
Limitations 
The meta-analysis presented above is subject to a number of limitations. Five are reviewed 
here. First, it is not possible to know that all empirical research studies on the relationship between 
TU and choice of CT in ITO research were identified and included in the final meta-analytical dataset. 
Although we conducted an extensive literature search, the possibility remains that we did not identify 
all relevant studies. In addition, some studies did not report the necessary statistics and, thus, were not 
included in the meta-analysis dataset. However, considering the extensive nature of our literature 
search process, we are confident that any excluded studies would not substantially affect the results 
presented above. 
Second, to address the file-drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979), we searched extensively for 
conference papers, dissertations, and working papers. Twenty-eight percent of the studies included in 
the meta-analysis fall into these three categories. We are confident that the file-drawer problem is not 
a potential major validity threat to the findings. 
Third, although the coding of TU resulted in high inter-coder reliability, the process of 
designing the coding scheme itself involved some subjectivity. To mitigate this risk, the variables 
were assigned to the operationalizations of TU based on their explicit use in primary studies. When 
this was in any doubt, the assignment was discussed and resolved between two of the authors. 
Fourth, we corrected the variables for only three statistical artifacts that are present in each 
study: sampling error, measurement error of TU, and measurement error of choice of CT. Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004) describe procedures to correct for other statistical artifacts including range restriction 
and dichotomization of continuous variables. However, information that must be extracted from the 
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individual studies to correct for these artifacts is rarely available and is, thus, beyond the scope of this 
meta-analysis. 
Fifth, estimates of the expected rhos (𝜌), particularly in the analysis of the different 
operationalizations of TU, are based on a small number of effect sizes. While a small number of effect 
sizes does not bias the estimates of the 𝜌, it may affect the estimates of the standard deviation of 𝜌 
that are used to calculate the credibility intervals (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). However, we calculated 
two additional meta-analytic measures to assess the generalizability of the results. All three measures, 
the 80-percent credibility interval around 𝜌 (𝐶𝑅2;.;<), the percentage of variance that is accounted for 
by statistical artifacts (%𝑉), and Cochran’s (1954) chi-square statistic for heterogeneity (𝑄), produce 
consistent results. There is no evidence of bias in the findings. 
In addition, our sampling frame, the relationship of TU and choice of CT, may limit the 
generalizability of the findings. The results reported above may not generalize to TCE-based 
relationships in the rest of the ITO literature. Against this threat, the meta-analytical dataset examined 
here can be treated as a stratified random sample from the ITO literature in terms of the proportion of 
the TCE-based relationships that are not supported. 
Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) report that 44% of TCE-based hypotheses are not supported 
and Lacity et al. (2011) report that 51% of TCE-based hypotheses are not supported. Partitioning the 
correlations in our meta-analytical dataset between those that significantly support and those that do 
not significantly support the logic of TCE, 41% support the logic of TCE and 59% do not support the 
logic of TCE. These proportions are not significantly different from those reported by Karimi-
Alaghehband et al. (2011) and by Lacity et al. (2011). So, the results reported here are unlikely to be 
specific to the relationship of TU and choice of CT, and are expected to generalize to other TCE-
based relationships in ITO. However, future research should investigate this assumption. 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
The results above have implications for the two strategies proposed to resolve the 
inconsistencies in TCE-based relationships in the ITO literature. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) 
call for more rigorous application of TCE in ITO research. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results 
presented here, the effect of the operationalization of TU in the research stream on the choice of CT, 
support their conclusions that the variance in findings is, at least partially, a function of construct 
validity threats. This conclusion may also generalize to the findings in other IS research domains.  
The findings also show that TCE has become an inappropriate analytical framework for ITO 
research. This supports the call by Lacity et al. (2011) for the development of an endogenous theory 
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of ITO. We agree that the search for, or development of, a new analytical framework is critical for 
future research on ITO. 
The core assumption underpinning the argument by Lacity et al. (2011) is that the ITO industry 
has become an industry with characteristics that go beyond the boundary conditions of TCE. For 
example, ITO vendors have developed management practices that allow them to “deliver positive 
results to clients while still generating positive margins” (Lacity et al., 2011, p. 151) in the 
increasingly competitive and consolidated ITO markets (Manning, 2013). In addition, ITO clients are 
becoming better informed due to increasing market transparency and increasing experience with ITO 
engagements (Reimann et al., 2010). These characteristics affect the trade-offs between monitoring 
costs and renegotiation costs, which reduce the benefits from making the choice of CT contingent on 
the level of TU.  
Specifically, ITO vendors increasingly offer standardized and modularized services that include 
detailed project plans, including functional requirements, service levels, and costs (Fink et al., 2013). 
These developments reduce the extent to which clients need to implement additional monitoring of 
vendor behavior. In addition, management practices, including technology enablement and IT factory 
facilities, provide extensive built-in monitoring capabilities for the client (Grönroos, 2011; Lacity et 
al., 2011).  
Renegotiation costs are incurred from adjusting the specification of an ITO engagement when 
facing unforeseen contingencies (Hoermann et al., 2015). Standardized and modularized services 
decouple the production of ITO services from particular ITO engagements and clients (Manning, 
2013). This enables ITO vendors to customize and adapt ITO service offerings more efficiently. 
Furthermore, standardized and modularized services have enabled ITO vendors to develop contractual 
governance mechanisms, including reliable risk buffers, and to price the costs for unforeseen 
contingencies into the contracts, independent of contract type. These developments have reduced the 
differential renegotiation costs under TM contracts compared with FP contracts. 
Historically, ITO clients entered into ITO contracts to improve the cost-efficiency of their IT 
operations. Recently, increased market transparency combined with the potential punitive loss of 
reputation from opportunistic vendor behavior have reduced the historical monitoring costs of TM 
contracts, reducing the need for clients to control vendor behavior (Dibbern et al., 2004). In addition, 
ITO clients now engage in co-creation partnerships with ITO vendors to deliver high ITO 
performance (Sarker et al., 2012; Vargo and Lusch, 2007). In combination, these developments have 
shifted the intent for both vendors and clients from improving the efficiency of ITO transactions to 
developing value-creating relationships. 
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The diminishing relevance of TCE, as argued by Lacity et al. (2011) and confirmed by our 
research, is in part a function of the increasing maturity of the ITO industry. Other IS researchers have 
commented on this increased maturity (See Manning et al., 2011; Stadtmann and Kreutter, 2009; 
Suarez et al., 2013). Our findings are also consistent with research on the relevance of TCE to IS 
reference disciplines (See, for example, Agarwal et al., 2002; Argyres and Bigelow, 2007; 
Karniouchina et al., 2013; Misangyi et al., 2006; Suarez et al., 2013). For example, in the automotive 
industry, Argyres and Bigelow (2007) show that the effect of transaction misalignment on firm 
survival varies across different phases of maturity. They conclude that the explanatory power of TCE 
is contingent on the maturity of an industry. Our results generalize this conclusion to the ITO 
industry. 
It is interesting to speculate about why the inconsistent findings reported by Karimi-
Alaghehband et al. (2011) and Lacity et al. (2011) had not been investigated earlier. To explore one 
potential explanation, consider the following evidence. Of the 28 studies in our final meta-analytical 
dataset, 17 studies use CT as a control variable and do not test the relationship explicitly. The studies 
use CT to control for differential governance modes.  
We assume that, prior to the reviews by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and Lacity et al. 
(2011), the null findings for the correlation between TU and CT post 1999 were not salient to 
researchers because CT was included in the analysis only as a control variable. So, ITO researchers 
did not recognize the potential importance of the cumulative null findings for the effect of TU on 
choice of CT. A similar explanation could also apply to the cumulative null findings in other ITO-
based research domains as reported in the two reviews that had not been recognized previously.  
Accepting the challenge proposed by Lacity et al. (2011), the critical question for future 
research on ITO is: What would be the components and the form of an “endogenous” ITO theory? By 
its name, TCE is fundamentally about costs. Within the TCE framework, the choice of CT is not 
about improving the quality of the service but about reducing transaction costs to improve market 
efficiency. We speculate that within the new “endogenous” ITO framework, the challenge would be 
to explain how to create value in ITO engagements.  
For example, Gopal and Koka (2012) and Hoberg et al. (2013) report that relational flexibility 
is a major driver of ITO performance. This suggests that an alternative analytical framework would 
focus on collaborative behavior between clients and vendors as opposed to a market-based and 
potentially adversarial relationship. Consistent with this framing, (Dibbern et al., 2004) argue that, in 
a transparent and competitive market, ITO vendors are motivated to propose a contract that enables 
the client to leverage the vendor’s specific expertise to create value. So, vendors should offer and 
clients should choose contracts that help to build flexible, effective relational governance to leverage 
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the vendor capabilities to create value for the client. This would transform models of vendor/client 
relationships from cost-based market relationships to value-based collaborative relationships. 
The domain of ITO, similar to other domains in IT research, is subject to the rapid changes and 
the constant adaptation of organizations to new economic, social, and technological realities (Gable, 
2010; Merali et al., 2012; Ward, 2012). In these domains, IS researchers must always examine the, 
often implicit, boundaries of applied theoretical frameworks. Such frameworks that have been useful 
lenses in the past may offer inconclusive or even misleading insights in the future. We argue that the 
search for ‘expiration dates’ of theoretical frameworks is a critical avenue of research to advance both 
the rigor and the relevance of IS research to strategic decision-making. Reviewing the core 
assumptions and boundaries of theoretical frameworks potentially improves the validity and relevance 
for IS executives to prepare “strategic decisions and control their effects” (Buhl et al., 2012, p. 176). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study presents support for the two explanations by Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and 
by Lacity et al. (2011) for the inconsistent findings in ITO research when TCE is adopted as the 
analytical framework. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) explain the inconsistent findings in terms of 
measurement errors and construct validity threats. They call for more rigorous research methodology 
to reduce inconsistent findings in the future. Supporting their conclusion and call, we show that the 
inconsistent findings on the relationship between TU and the choice of CT are contingent on how TU 
is operationalized.  
Lacity et al. (2011) explain the inconsistent findings by arguing that TCE is no longer an 
appropriate analytical framework for ITO research. They call for the development of a new analytical 
framework. Consistent with their explanation and call, we show that the effect of TU on the choice of 
CT is contingent on the period of investigation. In recent studies compared with early research, TU 
has a significantly weaker and potentially null effect on the choice of CT, independent of how TU is 
operationalized.  
This paper is not a test of TCE but rather of its relevance to investigating critical issues in ITO 
research. We conclude that it was relevant in the early period of ITO but is not relevant today. 
Generalizing our findings to the ITO literature, we agree with Lacity et al. (2011) that TCE is no 
longer a relevant and appropriate analytical framework for ITO research. Identifying and integrating 
the core constructs and core relationships of ITO into an effective analytical framework is necessary 
to further develop the theory of ITO and to provide guidance for both vendors and clients. 
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Appendix 1. Overview of Independent Samples 
Period of 
Investigation 
Studies using the same Sample 𝑵𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒚 𝑬𝑺  𝝆 
1986-1998 Kalnins and Mayer (2004)  394 5 .19 
Argyres et al. (2007) 386 3 
Weber et al. (2011) 385 3 
1989-2009 Bapna et al. (2012) 753 4 .11 
1989-2011 Chen and Heng (2012) 945 3 .10 
1993-2003 Chen and Bharadwaj (2009a) 112 1 .44 
1994-2006 Chen and Bharadwaj (2009b) 153 3 .09 
1994-2006 Subramanyam and Susarla (2011) 100 3 .18 
1995-1997 Ramachandran and Gopal (2010)  85 3 -.04 
Gopal and Koka (2012) 105 5 
1996-2001 Ethiraj et al. (2005) 138 3 .09 
1996-2005 Mani et al. (2013) 100 3 .02 
1997-1998 Banerjee and Duflo (2000) 167 5 -.04 
1998-2004 Susarla (2012) 141 4 .22 
2000-2003 Gefen et al. (2008) 238 3 .18 
2001-2001 Susarla et al. (2009) 153 2 .05 
2001-2004 Rai et al. (2009) 155 6 .04 
2002-2003 Tiwana (2008a) 209 3 -.14 
2002-2006 Langer (2007) 530 4 .00 
2004-2006 Huckman and Staats (2011) 562 1 .09 
Staats et al. (2011)* 727 1 
1,203 1 
Staats et al. (2012) 1,118 4 
2005-2010 Hoermann et al. (2012) 81 1 .23 
2006-2006 Tiwana (2008b) 120 3 .08 
Tiwana (2010) 120 2 
2007-2008 Srivastava and Teo (2012) 160 2 -.12 
2008-2008 Maruping and Ahuja (2012) 87 6 -.07 
2008-2011 Ramasubbu et al. (2011) 424 5 .04 
𝐍𝑺𝑨 =	22  𝐍𝑰𝑺 =	28  𝐍𝑬𝑺 =
	92 
 
Period of Investigation: ITO engagements for this sample fall into this timeframe; Studies using the same Sample: Multiple studies based 
on the same sample were included only when each of the studies reports at least one operationalization of TU that is not reported in the other 
studies. For instance, Kalnins and Mayer (2004), Argyres et al. (2007), and Weber et al. (2011) use the same sample but examine different 
aspects of ITO engagements. All three studies have a shared set of variables but each study provides a unique set of variables related to one 
ore more operationalization of TU; 𝑵𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒚: Subset of ITO engagements used in study; 𝑬𝑺: Effect sizes extracted from study (i.e., correlation 
coefficients of a variable related to task uncertainty and CT); 𝝆: Average corrected correlation (expected rho) of TU and CT; 𝐍𝑺𝑨: Number 
of independent samples included in the final meta-analytical dataset; 𝐍𝑰𝑺: Number of studies included in the final meta-analytical dataset; 
𝐍𝑬𝑺: Number of (potentially interdependent) effect sizes included in the final meta-analytical dataset; *: Staats et al. (2011) use different 
sample sizes for different variables in their analysis. See Dongus (2016) for the full meta-analytical sample.  
  
22 
Appendix 2. Definitions and Coding Examples for the Operationalizations of Task 
Uncertainty 
Operationalization of TU Definition Coding examples 
Technological uncertainty Uncertainty that stems from 
low experience with the 
technologies employed in 
the project (Nidumolu, 
1995) 
Technology knowledge of vendor 
(e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; 
Kalnins and Mayer, 2004); perceived 
technological uncertainty (e.g., 
Maruping and Ahuja, 2012) 
Requirements uncertainty Uncertainty regarding the 
client’s requirements 
(Nidumolu, 1995) 
Goal codifiability (e.g., Susarla et al., 
2009; Tiwana, 2010); incomplete 
specification (e.g., Gopal and Koka, 
2012; Susarla, 2012); extent of 
change requests (e.g., Huckman and 
Staats, 2011; Rai et al., 2009); 
outcome measurability (e.g., Kalnins 
and Mayer, 2004) 
Technological complexity Multiplicity and 
interdependence between 
different elements of the 
solution (Xia and Lee, 
2005) 
Breadth of tasks (e.g., Chen and 
Bharadwaj, 2009a; Susarla, 2012); 
type of task (e.g., Bapna et al., 2012; 
Langer et al., 2008); functions points 
(e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005; Rai et al., 
2009); perceived technological 
complexity (e.g., Gefen et al., 2008) 
Organizational complexity Multiplicity and 
interdependence between 
different elements of the 
organizational environment 
(Xia and Lee, 2005) 
Team size (e.g., Staats et al., 2012); 
multiplicity of vendors and clients 
involved (e.g., Maruping and Ahuja, 
2012); temporal and geographical 
dispersion (e.g., Maruping and 
Ahuja, 2012; Weber et al., 2011); 
offshore percentage (e.g., Chen and 
Heng, 2012; Staats et al., 2012) 
Project size Size of the project (Argyres 
et al., 2007) 
Effort (e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005; 
Staats et al., 2011); duration (e.g., 
Mani et al., 2012; Staats et al., 2012); 
monetary value (e.g., Argyres et al., 





Appendix 3. Mapping of Study Variables to the Different Operationalizations of Task 
Uncertainty 
𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅 Variable Description Study 
Technological Uncertainty (𝐤 = 𝟓, 𝐍 = 	𝟏, 𝟑𝟏𝟐) 
392 Programming Whether project involves programming Kalnins and 
Mayer (2004) 










Innovation Degree to which the project required 
innovation 
Argyres et al. 
(2007) 
167 Application area 
familiar to the firm  





familiar to the firm  
Whether the firm has experience with 
the programming tools 
Banerjee and 
Duflo (2000) 
Platform familiar to 
the firm  




209 Outsourcee ignorance Reverse score of the outsourcee firm’s 
knowledge 
Tiwana (2008a) 
120 Vendor domain 
knowledge 
Items for measuring domain knowledge Tiwana (2010) 
424 Newness Experience with technology Ramasubbu et al. 
(2011) 
Requirements Uncertainty (𝐤 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝐍 = 𝟐, 𝟑𝟎𝟏)    
394 Difficulty to measure 
quality 
Whether the technology used in the 






Four adapted questionnaire items  Gopal and Koka 
(2012) 
141 Complexity  Incomplete specification or 
transformational project 
Susarla (2012) 
153 Service uncertainty  Difficulty to estimate project 
specification 




Number of formal written changes Rai et al. (2009) 
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𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅 Variable Description Study 
562 Task change Percentage of requirements that have 
changed in the project 
Huckman and 
Staats (2011) 
120 Project goal 
codifiability  
Extent of written documentation Tiwana (2010) 




87 Requirement clarity  Simplicity of requirements, easy project 
guidelines, and clarity of specifications 
Maruping and 
Ahuja (2012) 
424 Requirement volatility  Effort spent on rework due to changes Ramasubbu et al. 
(2011) 
Technological Complexity (𝐤 = 𝟏𝟓, 𝐍 = 𝟒, 𝟒𝟐𝟎	) 






Whether the technological environment 
would be a source of problems during 
the project 
Ramachandran 
and Gopal (2010) 
Project type  New development or reengineering Gopal and Koka 
(2012) 
167 Y2K, CAD, Web 
Pages  




138 Project size and 
complexity  
Number of function points Ethiraj et al. 
(2005) 
753 Number of 
subsegments  




Complexity categories Bapna et al. 
(2012) 





945 Number of functions  Number of IT functions outsourced Chen and Heng 
(2012) 
100 Problem solving 
complexity  
Items to measure task-specific variables Subramanyam 
and Susarla 
(2011) 
100 Type of outsourcing Complexity categories Mani et al. (2013) 
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initiative  
141 Breadth of service  Sum of services performed by the 
vendor 
Susarla (2012) 
238 Perceived software 
complexity  
Items to measure interconnectivity 
between modules 




Items to measure module complexity Gefen et al. 
(2008) 
155 Project complexity  Number of adjusted function points Rai et al. (2009) 
530 Log of FP  Function points associated with the 
project 
Langer (2007) 





Measured on a five-item scale Maruping and 
Ahuja (2012) 
424 Project size  Forward counted function points Ramasubbu et al. 
(2011) 
Organizational Complexity (𝒌 = 𝟏𝟒,𝑵 = 𝟒, 𝟐𝟔𝟗) 
385.3 Interdependence  Customer personnel are listed as being 
responsible for some deliverables  
Argyres et al. 
(2007) 
Any-office-50  Vendor office within 50 miles Weber et al. 
(2011) 
Minimum distance  Geographic distance between client and 
closest vendor office 
Weber et al. 
(2011) 
105 Team size Number of team members Gopal and Koka 
(2012) 
138 Team size  Number of team members Ethiraj et al. 
(2005) 
153 Offshore (dummy 
variable) 
Software developed in the US versus 




945 Offshore  Service by offshoring/onshore vendor 
or domestic vendor 




Anticipated interdependence based on 
the strategic rationale for outsourcing 
Mani et al. (2013) 
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requirements 
155 Client representative  Whether a project team had a client 
representative present or not 
Rai et al. (2009) 
Client-meet  Number of visits by the client  Rai et al. (2009) 
Team-meet  Number of visits to the client site Rai et al. (2009) 
209 Outsourcer liaison 
team size  
Number of team members Tiwana (2008a) 
530 Team size  Number of people who have been 
allocated to the project 
Langer (2007) 
1,118 Team size  Number of team members Staats et al. 
(2012) 
SoftCo percentage  Coordination complexity due to 
employees working at different 
locations 
Staats et al. 
(2012) 
120 Project team size  Number of team members Tiwana (2008b) 
160 Team size  Number of vendor employees Srivastava and 
Teo (2012) 
87 Temporal dispersion  Number of time zones spanned Maruping and 
Ahuja (2012) 






Multiplicity of contractors and vendors 
and multiplicity of client units involved 
Maruping and 
Ahuja (2012) 
424 Team size  Full time headcount Ramasubbu et al. 
(2011) 
Client involvement  Effort spent on engaging with end users Ramasubbu et al. 
(2011) 
Project Size (𝐤 = 𝟐𝟎, 𝐍 = 𝟓, 𝟕𝟎𝟒) 
385.5 Dollar value  Total monetary value of the project Argyres et al. 
(2007) 
Duration  Number of weeks to complete the 
project 
Weber et al. 
(2011) 
95 Duration  Number of calendar days Gopal and Koka 
(2012) 
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𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅 Variable Description Study 
Effort  Measured in function points Gopal and Koka 
(2012) 
Cost  Total development cost Ramachandran 
and Gopal (2010) 
Financial risk  Risk in comparison to other projects of 
the vendor 
Ramachandran 
and Gopal (2010) 
167 Project size  Duration in person-months Banerjee and 
Duflo (2000) 
112 Contract duration  Number of months in contract  Chen and 
Bharadwaj 
(2009a) 
138 Person-months Number of person-months Ethiraj et al. 
(2005) 
753 Length  Total length of the contract in months Bapna et al. 
(2012) 
Contract value  Dollar value of the contract Bapna et al. 
(2012) 





945 Log of contract length  Duration in months Chen and Heng 
(2012) 
100 Duration  Length of the contract Subramanyam 
and Susarla 
(2011) 
Contract value  Monetary value of the project Subramanyam 
and Susarla 
(2011) 
100 Expectation of 
continuity of the 
relationship  
Length of the contract in months Mani et al. (2013) 
141 Contract length  Length is greater than 3 years or not Susarla (2012) 
Contract value  Log of the monetary value Susarla (2012) 
153 Length  Duration in years Susarla et al. 
(2009) 
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238 Project duration  Time invested Gefen et al. 
(2008) 
155 Project size  Size in lines of code Rai et al. (2009) 
209 Project duration  Duration in months Tiwana (2008a) 
530 Duration  Duration in months Langer (2007) 
1,041.5 KLOC  Size in kilolines of code Staats et al. 
(2011) 
Effort  Duration in hours Staats et al. 
(2011) 
Log of estimated effort  Duration in person minutes Staats et al. 
(2012) 
Log of estimated 
duration  
Time to complete the project Staats et al. 
(2012) 
120 Project alliance scope  Project size in comparison to other 
projects 
Tiwana (2008b) 
Project duration  Duration in months Tiwana (2008b) 
81 Project size  Estimated volume of the project Hoermann et al. 
(2012) 
87  Project size  Total cost of the project in US dollars Maruping and 
Ahuja (2012) 
𝑵𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅: We combined variables from studies analyzing the same sample by averaging the 𝑁E%	across all included variables. 
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Appendix 4. Sensitivity Analysis Controlling for Start Year of Sample (SYS) 
 𝒌 𝑵 𝝆 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓 𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎 %𝑽 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 
 
SYS	≤ 1996 9 2,788 .15 .07 .09 : .22 .06 : .24 .50 17.49* 9.15* 
SYS	> 1996 13 3,460 .05 .09 -.01 : .12 -.06 : .17 .44 29.55* 
 
SYS	≤ 1997 10 2,955 .14 .08 .07 : .21 .04 : .25 .46 21.42* 6.37* 
SYS	> 1997 12 3,293 .06 .09 -.01 : .13 -.05 : .17 .42 28.40* 
 
SYS	≤ 1999 11 3,096 .15 .08 .08 : .21 .05 : .25 .47 22.92* 9.09* 
SYS	> 1999 11 3,152 .05 .08 -.01 : .11 -.05 : .15 .45 24.18* 
 
SYS	≤ 2000 12 3,334 .15 .07 .09 : .21 .05 : .25 .50 23.71* 13.56* 
SYS	> 2000 10 2,914 .04 .07 -.03 : .10 -.05 : .13 .51 19.44* 
 
SYS	≤ 2001 14 3,642 .14 .08 .08 : .20 .04 : .24 .49 27.97* 9.68* 
SYS	> 2001 8 2,606 .04 .08 -.03 : .11 -.06 : .14 .42 18.73* 
𝒌: Number of effect sizes; 𝑵: Total sample size; 𝝆: Expected rho; 𝑺𝑫𝝆: Standard deviation of 𝜌; 𝑪𝑰𝝆;.𝟗𝟓: 95% confidence interval around 𝜌; 
𝑪𝑹𝝆;.𝟖𝟎: 80% credibility interval around 𝜌;	%𝑽: Percentage of variance that is accounted for by statistical artifacts;	𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏: Cochran’s chi-
square statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subset; 𝑸𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏: Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is explained 
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